This pape! examines a simple dynamic model in which agents vote over capital income taxatioD aad redistributive traDsfers. We show that in equilibrirult the typical agent's prelerences over the tax late are singlepeaked and derive a closed-form solution for the majority-rule tax rate. \ffe also show that high levels of initial wealih inequality can place ihe economy on the "wrong side of the Laffer curve'.
Introduction
This note presents a simple dynamic model of voting orer redistributive taxes and transfers. An iateresting feature of the model is the closed form solution which we obtain for a typical individual's most-preferred tax rate. We show that induced preferences.over the tax rate a.re singl+.peaked. We apply the median voter theorem to characterize the political equilibrium tax rate and transfer-We also show that for high levels of nealth inequality, measured as the deviation of the median from the mean of the initial wealth distribution, the median voter may choose a tax rate which is on ihe "wrong side of the Laffer curve". This a.rticie is a contribution to the growing literature which seeks to characterize the relationship between the distribution of wealth and the endogenous determination of policy para.meters, such as tax rates, within the context of dynamic economies. Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1994) show how the initiat distributiou of wealth would influeace the resulting long-rua distribution, as well as other wa.riables such as tax rates and consumption lerels, within the contqr:t of a model in which the median voter is assumed to determine the equilibrium tax rate-Huftnan (1996) also shows how the labor and capital tax rates'lvould fluctuate when a uajority voting scheme determines these parameters-2. The rnodel Individuals i! the economy live for two periods-The economic decisious which a typical individual makes are sequenced as follorvs. Each individual begins with some initial wealth y € y CII+.
In period one, an individua.l divides his or her idtial wea.lih inio consumption aod savings. Savings earn au 8.fter-tax returtr of (1 -d) & where ,8 is constant and d is the tax ret€. In period two, the ildividual consumes after-tax income from savings plus a per capita lumpsum trsrsfer r. The ta.x rate a.nd traJxsfer are identical across agents, and the trarsfer is fuunced with revenue collected ftom the tax on saviags income. Individuals have identical preferences oler consumption in the tr"o periods, aod these preferences are assr.med to iake the -logarithmic, time-additive forrl u(c1,c2): log (c1) + Blog (c2).
Prior to the period-one consumptioo-savings decision, individuals vote over tax-and-transfer schemes.
The imposition of a balanced govern-ment budgett together with second-period general equilibrium, means the issue space can be reduced to the on+ dimensiona.l choice of tsx rate. The political equilibrium concept is assumed to be majority rule in a standard tw!-party competition over the single issue d.
An individual with initial wealth g-iadividual g, for short-thus solves the following problem: then the majority-rule eqfibrium tar rate is zero. ff y^ < a, the equilibrium tax rate is gir.,en by 0-(g^/f).
Since the equilibrium ta>c rate depends oriy on g^f!, any change in the distribution of initial wealth which chaaged both the median and mean in the same proportion would leave the equilibrium tax rate ruafiected. On the other hand, if we take, as seems natural, a decrease in y^ fa to ir;'dicate a gteater level of wealth inequality, then greater itequality will be associated with higher rates of taxation. One can also compa.re the equilibrium tax rate to the tax rate, call it d", which would naximize the per capita transfer r- 
